Competition and Innovation. Evidence in Support of the Non-linear Relationship by Sauchanka, Palina
  
 
Website  www.ehl.lu.se 
 
Master programme in Economic Growth, 
 Innovation and Spatial Dynamics 
 
 
 
 
Competition and Innovation. 
Evidence in Support of the Non-linear Relationship 
 
Palina Sauchanka 
palina.sauchanka.138@student.lu.se 
 
 
Abstract: This paper empirically investigates the relationship between product market competition 
and innovation in seven European countries for the period 1987-2006. To approximate change in 
competition level three measures are considered: mark-up level, import penetration and the number 
of firms on the market. Innovation is measured as R&D intensity. The analysis shows that effect of 
product market competition on R&D intensity can be described with a non-linear function. Non-
linearity signifies that when competition level is low, an increase in competition rises R&D intensity, 
while with higher degree of competition on the market an upsurge of competition leads to lower 
R&D intensity.  
 
Key words: Innovation, R&D, competition 
 
 
 
 
EKHM51 
Master thesis (15 credits ECTS) 
June 2014  
Supervisor:  Jonas Ljungberg 
Examiner: Håkan Lobell     
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
2 
 
Contents 
 
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 3 
1.1. Theoretical and empirical background.............................................................................. 4 
1.2. Aim and scope of the study ............................................................................................. 12 
2. Methodological approach ...................................................................................................... 12 
2.1. Econometric model ......................................................................................................... 12 
2.2. Data description .............................................................................................................. 14 
2.2.1. Measurement of competition ................................................................................... 14 
2.2.2. Measurement of innovation ..................................................................................... 19 
2.2.3. Control variables ..................................................................................................... 19 
2.2.4. Definition of the market .......................................................................................... 19 
2.2.5. Endogeneity problem ............................................................................................... 20 
2.2.6. Sample ..................................................................................................................... 21 
3. Results ................................................................................................................................... 22 
3.1. Static model .................................................................................................................... 22 
3.1.1. Approach to estimation ............................................................................................ 22 
3.1.2. Mark-up measure ..................................................................................................... 23 
3.1.3. Import penetration ................................................................................................... 25 
3.1.4. Number of firms ...................................................................................................... 27 
3.1.5. Robustness check ..................................................................................................... 27 
3.2. Dynamic model ............................................................................................................... 29 
3.3 Additional specifications ..................................................................................................... 30 
3.3.1. Scandinavian countries ................................................................................................ 30 
3.3.2. High-tech versus low-tech industries .......................................................................... 31 
4. Discussion .............................................................................................................................. 32 
5. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 34 
References ..................................................................................................................................... 36 
Appendix ....................................................................................................................................... 38 
 
  
3 
 
 
1. Introduction  
Innovation has long been a heatedly debated issue both among policy-makers and academic 
researchers. The analysis of innovation has departed from treating innovation as a “black box” to 
a more detailed examination of factors behind it. While the benefits of innovation are no longer 
questioned, determinants of innovation are still in the focus of theoretical and empirical research. 
A number of factors on micro-, meso- and macro-levels are believed to influence innovative 
performance of firms.  
One of the market-level characteristics being analyzed in relation to innovation is competition. 
Economic theory usually treats competition as a favourable phenomenon. Microeconomics states 
that in general competition is associated with a decrease in prices on the market and an increase in 
the number of firms. As it is suggested by economic theory, when competition becomes more 
intensified, firms experience lower profits and prices of goods go down. Competition improves 
resource reallocation. As a consequence, social welfare is higher, when goods are produced by a 
number of competing firms, than if the market is operated by a monopolist. Such indicators of 
higher competition as easier entry and exit barriers, larger amount of firms and lower prices for 
goods are perceived as the desirable characteristics of a market. However, competition entails 
optimal resource reallocation only under certain theoretical assumptions. As shown by Arrow 
(1962), the theoretical grounds that turn competition into a desirable market outcome do not hold 
when a production process involves uncertainty, implying that under certain circumstances a 
monopoly may lead to higher social welfare. Innovation is understood as a source of uncertainty.  
In fact, the discussion on the influence competition has on innovation was initiated by Schumpeter 
(1942), who suggested that monopoly has more incentives to innovate, as well as has better access 
to resources. The negative effect of competition on innovation proposed by Schumpeter inspired 
a broad economic debate. Since then, economic literature has offered evidence both for and against 
this proposition. The earlier empirical studies tested linear cross-sectional dependence between 
competition and innovation, typically providing a support for Schumpeter’s argument. At the same 
time, some models proposed the opposite relationship (e.g. Arrow 1962), and also found the 
supporting evidence. The pioneering view on the topic was presented by Scherer (1967) who 
suggested the non-linear relationship between competition and innovation and found some 
empirical support for this view in a cross-sectional analysis.  Nevertheless, since then empirical 
studies has to a greater extent focused on linear specifications. Only in 2005 the seminal paper by 
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Aghion et al. (2005) revived the non-linear model. Aghion et al. (2005) suggested a theoretical 
framework that explained existence of the U-inverted relationship between competition and 
innovation. The paper also provided empirical support for the hypothesis using the panel data on 
the UK firms. The non-linearity proposition inspired further research on the topic, which still 
reports mixed results. 
This paper aims to investigate greater in detail how the level of product market competition 
influences innovation activity across European manufacturing industries. In particular, this paper 
tests the hypothesis about the non-linear U-inverted relationship between R&D intensity and 
competition for several European countries. As the previous research has neglected a group of 
Scandinavian countries, this paper intends to add Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden to the 
sample. Unifying methodological approaches taken from the previous studies and using a broad 
dataset, this study aims to contribute to understanding of the relationship between product market 
competition and innovation. To a larger extent aims of the study are motivated by the previous 
literature, therefore, the aims are discussed greater in detail after the literature review.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 reviews theoretical and empirical literature on the 
topic and formulates purposes of the study, Section 2 discusses methodological approach and data. 
Some limitations of the study are also discussed. The econometric analysis with a brief description 
of the results is presented in Section 3. Section 4 provides the discussion of the results. Section 5 
concludes the paper. 
1.1. Theoretical and empirical background 
The debate on innovation and competition was initiated by Schumpeter (1942). Schumpeter argues 
that commonly asserted beneficial effect of competition may not be the case when it comes to 
innovation. On a competitive market threat of imitation exists. Innovation developed by a 
competitive firm can be imitated by rivals immediately after it was presented to the market. 
According to Schumpeter, the threat of imitation makes incentives of a competitive firm weaker, 
than those of a monopolist. By innovating a monopolist prevents entrance of new players and, 
thus, imitation. Moreover, firms with greater market power on more concentrated markets tend to 
innovate more due to easier access to resources. All in all, Schumpeter implies that innovation 
may increase when competition is low (“Schumpeterian effect”). In contrast, Arrow (1962) argues 
that a monopolist may be reluctant to innovate. Arrow adds the concept of intellectual property 
rights to the analysis. When protected by intellectual property rights, a monopolist exploits the 
protected technology to seek profits. With no threat of competition profit maximization is possible 
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without developing the new technology. The model also shows that firms on a competitive market 
have higher returns on process innovation, than do dominant firms on concentrated markets.  
Following Arrow’s propositions Chen and Schwartz (2013) develop a model describing profits of 
a monopolist. Distinguishing between radical and incremental innovation and between process and 
product innovation, the authors conclude that a monopolist has more incentives to invest in 
incremental product innovation than a competitive firm on a non-concentrated market. When the 
monopolist’s position on the market is not threatened by new entries, innovation is considered as 
a way to renovate the old product so as to establish new pricing strategies and gain higher post-
innovation profits. However, when a monopolist expects a certain threat from new entries, 
incentives to preempt competition increase (Gilbert & Newbery 1982). In attempt to preserve the 
market share, a monopolist may invest in innovation. 
Similarly, Greenstein and Garey (1998) argue that a secured monopolist has the same incentives 
to invest in incremental product innovation as a firm under competition pressure, however, a 
monopolist threatened by entry of new firms have greater innovation incentives. Moreover, the 
model predicts that social welfare may be greater when incremental innovation is being developed 
on a monopolistic, rather than on a competitive market. In an attempt to innovate, all the 
competitive firms invest in R&D, while on a monopolistic market it is only a monopolist who 
invests. Thus, to develop one technology the competitive firms incur greater costs, than a 
monopolist. A monopolist may produce valuable innovation at lower costs. The main proposition 
of the paper is that, despite the common belief, in high-tech industries where gains from innovating 
are significant, monopolies may be more socially preferred than intense rivalry.  
The empirical support of Schumpeterian effect is found in the study by Scherer (1967). Scherer 
tests the hypothesis that innovation effort is negatively related to competition using cross-section 
data on US manufacturing companies. Innovative effort is measured by three indicators of R&D-
related employment (namely employment of scientists and engineers in firms). Competition is 
approximated by concentration ratios. The analysis demonstrates that dominant firms on more 
concentrated markets have higher rates of innovation activity. Furthermore, Scherer adds squared 
concentration ratio to the model and finds a weak support for non-linearity. The author argues that 
there exists a threshold effect: after a certain level of concentration is reached, rise of market 
concentration loses its significance as an economic impetus. 
An attempt to test for a non-linear relationship can also be found in Scott (1984). The paper 
provides the empirical support for the inverted U-shaped relationship between market 
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concentration and innovation expenditure for a cross-section of US companies. However, the 
significance disappears when industry and firms effects are included into the model. At the same 
time, using survey-based data Levin et al. (1985) provide evidence for the U-inverted relationship 
between market concentration and innovation, where innovation is measured as a ratio of 
company-financed R&D expenditure to sales. Even though these studies presented at least some 
empirical support for the non-linearity hypothesis, further studies focused on linear models. As a 
matter of fact, the idea of non-linearity found a weak empirical support and did not have a 
theoretical model behind it. Thus, the early research to a greater extent focused on linear models. 
Geroski (1990) summarizes ways in which a monopoly affects innovative activity. On the one 
hand, stronger incentives of a monopoly to raise entry barriers and preempt competition, as well 
as better access to resources are expected to result in a positive influence on innovative activity 
(so-called “positive effect” of a monopoly). On the other hand, managers may become lazy when 
there is no threat of entry, thus postponing innovation-related decisions (“negative effect”).  In line 
with Arrow’s argument Geroski claims that a monopolist has weak incentives to innovate. The 
author unifies both effects in the theoretical model and tests the model on a cross-section of UK 
firm-level data. The analysis shows that the “negative effect” prevails. In particular, the data 
provides evidence against the inverse relationship between innovation activity and competition. 
The author underlines that on competitive markets there are more actors searching for 
technological improvements, and therefore, there is a higher probability of finding innovative 
solutions, than if only a monopolist develops new ideas.  
It should be noted that the majority of early empirical studies, as well as some of the more recent 
ones employ cross-sectional data. Reliance on the cross-sectional analysis can be misleading when 
a study aims to detect causal relationship. Furthermore, inability to control for several observable 
and unobservable factors may distort the estimation results (Griffith et al. 2010). To deal with this 
challenge, panel data should be used. For instance, fixed effects model can be used to control for 
unobserved effects that are constant over the period of interest. Another methodological difficulty 
of the early research is the endogeneity problem. Presumably, the reverse causality may take place, 
implying that not only competition affects innovation, but also innovative performance has an 
impact on the character of competition on the market. The cross-sectional data can hardly tackle 
this problem. Whereas panel data takes into account change in time and can capture exogenous 
variation (reforms, institutional changes, etc.)  
These methodological issues are dealt with in the study by Nickell (1996). The author uses the UK 
firm-level panel data to analyze whether higher competition leads to a higher rate of technological 
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progress. Technological progress is measured as growth in total factor productivity. Apart from 
competition measures and control variables, the author also includes lagged productivity in the 
model, justifying that a firm may have a delayed response to an exogenous change. The analysis 
reveals that higher number of firms and lower profits on the market each lead to higher productivity 
of firms. Firms operating on more concentrated markets are found to be less productive. Thus, in 
contrast to Schumpeterian’s view, competition is interpreted as an unambiguously favourable 
market phenomenon, at least in relation to technological progress. The same view is expressed in 
the study by Blundell et al. (1999). Using the UK firm-level panel data the authors find the negative 
effect of market concentration on innovative activity. Innovative activity is approximated by patent 
count indicators. Competition is measured by a concentration ratio. Treating market as an industry, 
the authors add that industries with high concentration ratio demonstrate lower levels of innovation 
activity, implying the direct causal relationship between market concentration and innovation. 
However, it is also found that within industries dominant firms innovate more. This result is 
interpreted as pointing to higher incentives of dominant firms to prevent competition. 
Aghion et al. (2005) claim that competition has a non-linear effect on innovation. The authors 
construct a theoretical model that explains non-linearity. In brief, the model proposes that non-
linearity arises due to the fact that some markets respond to higher competition pressure by 
increasing innovative activity, while other markets reduce innovation. The more detailed 
description of the model follows. First of all, the model suggests that at any point of time there are 
two types of industries in the economy: “neck-and-neck” and “leader-follower”.1 The model 
proposes that firms innovate to reduce their costs or, to put it differently, to improve their 
technological level. Firms in “neck-and-neck” industries perform on similar technological levels 
and have similar production costs. Other things being equal, firms in “neck-and-neck” industries 
have no incentives to innovate. However, in case they innovate, they may considerably reduce 
their costs, thus they may outperform the competitors and change the state of the industry. The 
state of an industry, where a difference in production costs among firms is significant is called 
“leader-follower”. “Leaders” have low costs and high post-innovation profits, therefore, they have 
no incentives to innovate. Whereas laggard firms (“followers”) have low profits. Other things 
being equal, they have strong incentives to innovate so as to reduce costs and catch-up with leading 
firms. If “followers” successfully innovate they catch-up with “leaders”, gap in production costs 
disappears, and industry turns into a “neck-and-neck” state.  
                                                 
1 As it is common in empirical research on competition, industries are considered as product markets. Thus, describing 
changes in competition within an industry, Aghion et al. (2005) imply changes in competition on a particular product 
market. In other words, terms “market” and “industry” are used interchangeably.  
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Secondly, two states reveal different response to an increase in competition. In general, a rise of 
competition pressure reduces profits. To avoid a decrease in profits firms in “neck-and-neck” 
industries, which initially have medium profits, invest in innovation (“escape-competition-
effect”). By innovating these firms may turn into “leaders” and, thus, earn high profits. Hence, 
these firms increase investment in innovation, when competition rises. On the contrary, an increase 
in competition in “leader-follower” industries leads to a decrease in innovation. By assumption 
“leaders” do not innovate, as they have high profits. At the same time, followers become less 
willing to innovate, as under higher competition the reward for catching up with leaders 
diminishes. Consequently, under higher competition pressure, firms in “leader-follower” 
industries invest less in innovation.  
Finally, the U-inverted curve arises because each of two states corresponds to a certain degree of 
competition. In particular, “neck-and-neck” industries are associated with low level of competition 
and high competition is associated with “leader-follower” industries. In other words, when 
competition is low in the industry, the model suggests that this industry is likely to be “neck-and-
neck” industry. Whereas, when competition is high in the industry, this industry is more likely to 
represent the “leader-follower” type. The model explains these associations in the following way. 
When competition is initially very low, firms in “neck-and-neck” industries earn similar profits 
and have no incentives to invest in innovation. As these firms do not innovate, the industry state 
does not change into “leader-follower”.  At the same time, if competition is initially very low in 
“leader-follower” industries, laggard firms can innovate in order to catch-up with leaders. If they 
succeed in innovating, they turn industry into “neck-and-neck”. In other words, when competition 
pressure is low, it is likely that industry turns from “leader-follower” into “neck-and-neck”, 
however, it’s unlikely that “neck-and-neck” industry changes it state into “leader-follower”. Thus, 
low level of competition is associated with “neck-and-neck” industries. The opposite becomes 
apparent for higher degrees of competition. If competition is initially high in “neck-and-neck” 
industries, the firms innovate in order to escape competition, therefore, they turn an industry into 
“leader-follower” state. Whereas under high competition followers in “leader-follower” industries 
are unlikely to innovate, as the reward from catching up with leaders falls. Moreover, leaders do 
not innovate, as they are already on higher technological levels than their rivals. Consequently, 
under high competition, it is likely, that an industry turns into “leader-follower” state. Thus, high 
level of competition is associated with “leader-follower” industries.  
These correspondence between states of industries and competition degrees engenders the U-
inverted relationship between innovation and competition. Figure 1 illustrates the essence of the 
non-linear relationship. The left tail of the curve is represented by “neck-and-neck” industries. For 
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these industries “escape-competition-effect” becomes apparent, thus, with initially low level of 
competition a rise in competition pressure leads to an upsurge of innovation activity. The right tail 
is represented by “leader-follower” industries. When competition is initially high “Schumpeterian 
effect” takes place, in particular, a rise of competition entails lower level of innovation activity. 
In general, the model predicts a non-monotonic U-inverted relationship between competition and 
innovation. The advantage of this model is that it combines two conflicting approaches to 
explaining the causality between competition and innovation. 
Using the panel data on firms listed on the London Stock Exchange, Aghion et al. (2005) provide 
empirical support for the model predictions. Non-linearity is captured by the Poisson regression, 
where dependent variable is constructed using a patent count data. Competition is measured 
through the approximation of Lerner index. To tackle endogeneity problem, market regulations 
are taken into consideration.  
Several studies continue testing the hypothesis about the U-inverted relationship.  The study by 
Du and Chen (2010) considers a wide range of competition indicators and implements five of them 
to estimate the influence of competition on innovative activity of Chinese firms. The authors use 
three types of dependent variables. They estimate innovation inputs, outputs and innovation 
efficiency. Innovation input is calculated as a ratio of R&D expenditure to total sales. Innovation 
output is estimated as a ratio of new product sales to total sales. It should be mentioned that such 
a measure captures both innovation and imitation, as new product sales reflect products new to the 
firms and not to the market. Finally, efficiency of innovation is represented by a ratio of new 
Figure 1. U-inverted relationship between innovation and competition 
Source: after Aghion et al. (2005) 
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product sales to R&D expenditure. The analysis provides an empirical support for non-linear 
relationship between competition and innovation when Lerner index and concentration ratios are 
considered. Tingvall and Poldahl (2006) test Aghion’s proposition using the sample of Swedish 
firms for the period of time from 1990 to 2000. Using two measurements of firm-level competition, 
the authors find dissimilar patterns in the relationship. Estimation of the relationship between 
Herfindahl-Hirshman index and R&D expenditure provides empirical evidence supporting the 
non-linearity hypothesis. However, it is found that price cost margin negatively affects R&D 
expenditure. Thus, estimation based on the price cost margin indicator does not support the 
proposition. The authors relate such an effect to endogeneity of price cost margin. Polder and 
Veldhuizen (2010) provide empirical evidence in support of the U-inverted relationship while 
examining both manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors in the Netherlands. The authors use 
two indicators of competition: price cost margin and profit elasticity. Profit elasticity measures a 
decrease in profits that appears due to a rise in marginal costs. The idea behind the measure is that 
profits of firms fall when costs rise, but when competition is high this loss in profits is even larger. 
Firms on more competitive markets are thought to be “punished” for being less efficient. When 
the analysis is conducted on industry-level the non-linearity hypothesis is supported for profit 
elasticity. Whereas firm-level analysis reveals non-linear relationship for both measures.  
However, some studies question the U-inverted relationship. Hashmi (2010) criticizes the 
empirical approach used by Aghion et al. (2005). He mentions that the data used in the study does 
not satisfy the assumptions of a method (Poisson regression). The author replicates the analysis 
for both the US and UK firms using the negative binomial model. The regression results for the 
UK companies support the non-monotonic relationship between competition and innovation, while 
the results based on the US firms do not. In general, the U.S. data reveals the inverse relationship 
between competition and innovation, thus supporting Schumpeterian hypothesis. To comment the 
differences in the results from two countries the author proposes two explanations. Firstly, two 
datasets obviously differ. Secondly, the differences in characters of economic conditions on the 
markets of two countries may influence the results. In particular, the author describes UK markets 
as more “neck-and-neck” than those in the US. Another study that questions the non-linearity 
hypothesis is a paper by Askenazy et al. (2008). Using a sample of French firms and survey-based 
measures of innovation, the authors find the non-linear relationship. However, non-linearity holds 
only for the largest firms. When the whole sample is considered, only the linear positive effect of 
competition on innovation is found to be significant. Another result is that with higher costs the 
relationship between competition and innovation becomes flatter. Thus, the estimation points out 
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that small firms and firms with high production costs are not as sensitive to competition pressure, 
as large firms with lower costs. 
Following the line of reasoning developed in Aghion’s model, Griffith et al. (2010) take into 
account change in profits to estimate the link between competition and innovation. The study 
examines manufacturing industries in thirteen EU member states. The authors exclude Sweden, 
Denmark and Finland due to the differing industrial composition. The analysis is focused on the 
outcomes of the Single Market Programme. One of the aims of the programme was to promote 
product market competition in the EU member states. Taking the reform into account provides 
analysis with the exogenous variation. The outcomes of the reform are quantified as an index 
variable. More specifically, the instrumental variable approach is used. On the first stage, the effect 
of the SMP reform on market profits is estimated. On the second stage, the effect of profits on 
innovation is analyzed. It is found that the reform decreased market profits implying an increase 
in competition. Competition in turn increased investment in R&D. The model predicts the linear 
positive relationship between competition and innovation. 
To summarize, even after Aghion et al. (2005) suggested a theoretical model that is able to unify 
two contradictory views on the relationship between competition and innovation, empirical 
literature still provides mixed results. All in all, several features of research design of more recent 
studies should be underlined. First of all, the studies largely focus on panel data, thus better dealing 
with unobserved factors, than in the early studies where cross-section data was used. Secondly, 
the analysis of previous research reveals that results of estimation are sensitive to the choice of 
competition measures, suggesting that a wider choice of variables should be considered to provide 
robust estimates. Moreover, the sample construction affects the results. Polder and Veldhuizen 
(2010) emphasize that even if the theoretical model is correct, the non-linearity hypothesis may 
not be supported if the sample is not heterogeneous enough. For instance, if markets under 
consideration are all “neck-and-neck”, the data reveals the positive relationship between product 
market competition and innovation. Polder and Veldhuizen (2010) underline that the U-
relationship can be identified only when sample includes industries with both high and low levels 
of competition. In fact, the degree of competition can be influenced by institutions of a particular 
country. Thus, it makes sense to have a broader set of observations and not to limit analysis to a 
single country. Finally, the studies that acknowledge possibility of endogeneity in competition 
either use policy instruments or data transformation so as not to distort estimation results.  All this 
features of research design should be taken into account in the empirical investigation. 
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1.2. Aim and scope of the study 
This paper aims to improve understanding of the relationship between innovation and competition 
by examining the effects of the product market competition on innovation across several European 
countries. The contribution of this paper is fourfold. Firstly, this study intends to throw some light 
on determinants of innovation by testing Aghion’s proposition of non-linearity between innovation 
and competition. Secondly, the study intends to test the non-linearity hypothesis for a broader set 
of countries. Existing studies to a greater extent focus on a single country. Since the theoretical 
model predicts that effect of competition depends on the industry characteristics, a variety in 
observations is needed to provide reliable estimates. Therefore, to ensure greater variety, seven 
countries with different pace of economic development are considered. Thirdly, Scandinavian 
countries are included in the analysis. In fact, the previous empirical examination to a greater 
extent is limited to the USA, UK and Western Europe with minor attention to Scandinavian 
countries. For instance, while concentrating on Europe, Griffith et al. (2010) ignore Nordic 
countries due to higher innovation performance. Current study aims to take into account innovative 
performance of Scandinavian countries. Finally, the study intends to control for endogeneity in 
competition by using data on the policy reform. In addition, with the aim to add robustness to the 
estimation results three different measures of competition are used for the analysis and several 
model specifications are examined.   
2. Methodological approach 
This section describes the methodological approach to the empirical analysis. Firstly, the 
econometric model is described and expected estimation results are outlined. Next, the data is 
discussed in greater detail. 
2.1. Econometric model 
As mentioned in the previous section, the choice of the model was motivated by the conclusions 
made in the study by Aghion et al. (2005). The goal is to test the non-linearity proposition. In 
Aghion’s paper patent count data is examined by means of Poisson regression. This study uses a 
continuous measure of innovation, therefore, non-linearity is modelled by means of a polynomial 
function. In particular, the quadratic function is considered.  
Variation in innovation activity across industries is likely to be influenced not only by competition, 
but also by other meso-level factors. Characteristics of goods produced in an industry may directly 
or indirectly affect innovative performance. Product durability, target customers, sensitivity of 
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demand, threat of substitution are among many factors that determine features of innovative 
activities for a particular industry. Hence, to account for differences among industries it is 
important to control for industry effects when constructing a model. Similarly, characteristics of a 
particular country are likely to have an impact on innovative performance of firms. Regulation, 
openness to international cooperation, tax burden and efficiency of institutions are among the 
potential determinants of innovation.  Therefore, country effects should also be taken into account. 
Furthermore, to account for macroeconomic changes, year effects should be included into the 
model. 
Apart from country and industry effects, control variables should be incorporated into the model. 
Country-level characteristics may explain a considerable share of variation in innovation activity 
across countries (Furman et al. 2002). In fact, there is no united opinion on the set of variables that 
should be included in the models that predict innovative activity. Obviously, all the observed and 
unobserved factors can hardly be included in the model. Having at least some control variables in 
the model (even if they are not significant) decreases the omitted variable bias. In addition, the 
problem of omitted variable bias is partly lessened by the error term and the fixed effects approach. 
(Verbeek 2004, p.344). Stock market capitalization in relation to a country’s GDP, as well as GDP 
per capita are usually taken into account. Following Furman et al. (2002) spending on tertiary 
education as a share of GDP is also included into the model.  
To capture a possible non-linear U-inverted relationship the model was constructed in the 
following way: 
  𝑦𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑡
2 + ∑ 𝛾𝑐𝑑𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑐 +𝑖  ∑ 𝛿𝑡𝑑𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑐 +𝑖 ∑ 𝜇𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑐 +𝑖 𝜃𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝜐𝑖𝑐𝑡                (I) 
Index i denotes industries2, c - countries and t - years. The dependent variable 𝑦𝑖𝑐𝑡 stands for 
innovation activity and is measured by R&D intensity, defined as R&D expenditure over value 
added. The key independent variable 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑡 is an approximation of competition. The choice of 
variables is clarified in the next subsection. The variable 𝑑𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑐 denotes dummy variables for 
countries. Dummy variables for time are denoted by 𝑑𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑐. Dummy variables controlling for 
industry effects are denoted by 𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑐3.  The variable 𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡 represents the vector of control variables 
(GDP per capita, spending on tertiary education as a percentage of GDP and stock market 
capitalization). Error term is denoted as 𝜐𝑖𝑐𝑡.  
                                                 
2 Unit of observation is an industry in a particular country. So that, for instance, Food industry in Denmark and Food 
industry in Germany are denoted by different values of index i.  
3 This dummy variable is included to capture industry characteristics. It distinguishes only between industries, so 
that, for instance, Food industry in Denmark and Food industry in Germany have the same value of this dummy 
variable. 
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When 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑡 represents a direct measure of competition, a positive coefficient 𝛽1 and a negative 
𝛽2 are thought to provide a support for the U-inverted relationship. Polder and Veldhuizen (2010) 
underline, that apart from signs of coefficients, it is important to calculate whether the turning 
point of the inverted U-curve lies in the range of data. By definition, the turning point of quadratic 
function is calculated as the ratio of coefficients −𝛽1/2𝛽2. Additionally, the marginal effect in a 
specific point is usually considered for a non-linear function. By definition, marginal effect is 
calculated as following  
𝜕𝑦
𝜕𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝
= 𝛽1 + 2𝛽2𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖. The marginal effect is commonly estimated for 
mean or median value of a variable.  
Additionally, a second model was developed. Model II incorporates lagged R&D intensity 
(𝑦𝑖𝑐𝑡−1). Consideration of lagged variable is motivated by the idea that firms do not always 
immediately respond to a change in economic conditions. Firms may need some time to take 
certain strategic decisions (Nickell 2006) All in all, the purpose of testing a dynamic model is to 
provide robustness to the analysis. In particular, the purpose is to investigate whether non-linearity 
holds when lagged R&D intensity is included into the model.  
𝑦𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝑦𝑖𝑐𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑡
2 + ∑ 𝛾𝑐𝑑𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑐 +𝑖  ∑ 𝛿𝑡𝑑𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑐 +𝑖 ∑ 𝜇𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑐 +𝑖 𝜃𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝜐𝑖𝑐𝑡   (II) 
To avoid correlation of the lagged variable and the error term, the model was transformed and 
estimated in the first differences. 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝜇∆𝑦𝑖𝑐𝑡−1 + 𝛽1∆𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽2∆𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑡
2 + ∑ 𝛾𝑐∆𝑑𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑐 +𝑖  ∑ 𝛿𝑡∆𝑑𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑐 +𝑖 ∑ 𝜇𝑖∆𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑐 +𝑖 𝜃∆𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡 +
+∆𝜐𝑖𝑐𝑡                    (III) 
Again, a positive coefficient 𝛽1 and a negative 𝛽2 are thought to provide a support for the U-
inverted relationship between competition and innovation. 
2.2. Data description 
2.2.1. Measurement of competition 
Competition is quite an extensive and abstract concept. Microeconomic theory interprets an 
increase in competition as an increase in the number of firms on the market. The result of 
intensified competition is lower prices and lower average profit. In more complex models an 
increase in competition can be treated as lowering of entry barriers, a rise of product 
substitutability on the market, a change from Cournot to Bertrand model of competition, etc. 
(Boone 2000). Type of goods produced, age of companies, life-cycle stage of a market, 
dependence on suppliers, openness to international trade are among the factors that affect the 
character of competition between economic actors.  
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With numerous factors involved, quantification of competition becomes a challenging task. Boone 
(2000) generalizes that there are three ways by which higher competition in markets occurs. The 
first way is a decrease in entry costs which results in the increased number of firms on the market. 
The second is more intensified aggressiveness of interactions between firms, which, for instance, 
becomes apparent when competitors start producing closer substitutes. Thirdly, competition 
becomes more intense when competitors have lower production costs. Lower production costs 
imply higher efficiency of a firm. Cost-efficient firms are able to reduce production prices, thus 
making it harder for the opponents to compete. These three scenarios provide a basis for 
parameterization of competition. The first scenario can be parameterized either by entry costs or 
by the amount of firms on the market. The second can be approximated by some firm-level 
characteristics, for instance, by the degree of product substitutability. Finally, to parameterize the 
third one costs of firms can be considered. 
Even though there exist several types of measures that are based on the above mentioned 
approaches to parameterization, a proper way of quantifying competition pressure is still an open 
question. In general, in empirical research, three types of competition measures are considered. 
Firstly, some studies, especially in the earlier literature, focus on market-related effects of 
competition. In particular, such market structure indicators as concentration ratio and the number 
of firms are often considered. Higher concentration ratio means that larger share of output is 
produced by a smaller amount of firms. Thus higher concentration ratio is associated with the 
higher market power among the dominant firms. Commonly in the empirical studies concentration 
ratios are calculated for the top four dominant firms. However, concentration ratios do not account 
for either the distribution among the dominant firms or among the rest (Du & Chen 2010).  At the 
same time, such an indicator as the number of firms on the market is criticized for ignoring market 
shares of companies (Gilbert 2008). 
The second type of indicators are price-related measures. In fact, monopoly pricing has long been 
a focus of the literature on competition. Prices established above marginal costs are commonly 
associated with higher market power. Mathematically this idea is expressed by Lerner index ((P-
MC)/P, where P stands for price of a product and MC denotes marginal costs). However, in 
practice, the index is hard to obtain due to limited information on marginal costs of economic 
agents.  
Thirdly, competition can be approximated by profit-related indicators. Changes in profits may 
reflect changes in number of customers, number of competitors, trade barriers and market 
conditions on the whole. Comparison of measures based on profits is a way of assessing firms’ 
relative performance. Advantage of profit-based measures of competition is that they do not rely 
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on the definition of market. Therefore, they capture pressure from both domestic and international 
firms (Aghion et al. 2005). In addition, profit-related measures are believed to discern more 
intensified aggressiveness of interactions between firms. Boone (2000) claims that profit-related 
indicators are more robust estimates of competition than market-related, as they reflect all three 
scenarios of increased competition (change in number of firms, in aggressiveness of interaction 
and in production costs). 
Results of empirical estimation can be sensitive to the choice of measures. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to use several types of measurements in the analysis. This paper considers three 
measures of competition: the mark-up measure, import penetration and the number of firms on the 
market. The mark-up measure is a profit-related indicator, import penetration and the number of 
firms are market-related measures. More detailed description of the variables follows.  
The first measure is an approximation of firm profitability – the mark-up measure. The basic idea 
of constructing the mark-up measure is to obtain a ratio of firm’s revenues and costs. By definition, 
mark-ups are thought to be inversely related to competition. More specifically, higher mark-ups 
of firms are believed to reflect lower competition pressure. For instance, other things being equal, 
monopolistic mark-ups are higher than those of firms on a competitive market. Thus an increase 
in average mark-ups implies low competition, whereas a decrease in mark-ups is associated with 
the rise of competition.  
Boone (2000) claims that such a type of competition measure is theoretically robust. Griffith et al. 
(2010) mention that a mark-up measure is an increasing function of the Lerner index and, therefore, 
should be considered as preferable measure of competition on the industry-level. Following 
Griffith et al. (2010) the industry-level mark-ups (𝑚) are calculated as the ratio of value added to 
the sum of labour and capital costs: 
𝑚 =
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑
𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 + 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠
 
The data for a ratio was collected in nominal prices in local currencies due to the absence of the 
data in real prices. Nominal values are usually transformed into real values to eliminate the effects 
of changes in price level. Since the variable of interest is a result of division, the effect from a 
change in price level is eliminated simply by calculation.  
The data on Value Added and Labour Costs was collected from the OECD STAN Database. To 
have a measure of capital costs additional calculations were conducted. Capital costs is a product 
of capital stock and cost of capital (Müller 2010). The conventional way of estimating capital stock 
is to use perpetual inventory method (Du & Chen 2010; Aghion et al. 2005; Griffith et al. 2010).  
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The essence of the perpetual inventory method is that it estimates the capital stock by summarizing 
the previous purchases of assets over the period of its service lives (Measuring Capital: OECD 
Manual 2001). Thus, capital stock 𝐾𝑡 for the period t is calculated in the following way: 
𝐾𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑡 
where 𝛿 is the rate of depreciation and 𝐼𝑡 is investment. Investment is measured as the amount of 
gross fixed capital formation.  
Following (Müller 2010) the initial capital stock was estimated as an average investment of the 
industry over the period under consideration. Data on gross fixed capital formation and investment 
was obtained from OECD STAN Database. The depreciation rate of 5% is considered (e.g. Müller 
2010). 
To obtain cost of capital either a constant or long-term interest rate can be considered. Following 
Griffith et al. (2010) the data on the US long-term interest rate was used to estimate the cost of 
capital. The calculations imply the assumption that there is a free capital movement across the 
markets and all the countries can borrow at the world’s interest rate. Data on the US interest rate 
was collected from the OECD Interest rates statistics. Thus, the perpetual inventory method 
provides the final component (capital costs).for calculating the variable of interest (mark-ups).   
It should be noted that this methodological approach relies on estimations. However realistic the 
assumptions may be, estimation results may still differ from the reality. Yet, as regards the 
estimation of capital costs, the measurement errors are not expected to bias the results of the 
analysis due to the following reasons. Firstly, capital costs are considerably lower than labour 
costs, thus they have lower impact on the target variable (see summary statistics for the variables 
used to calculate the mark-up measure in the Appendix, Table 3). Secondly, since essentially the 
analysis is focused on changes of variables over time, rather than on their absolute values, 
measurement inaccuracies in the capital costs estimation are not expected to significantly distort 
the results.  
As regards the variable of interest, mark-ups can entail certain difficulties in interpretation of the 
results due to the fact they are inversely related to competition. Polder and Veldhuizen (2006) 
suggest using linear transformation to turn the inverse measures of competition into direct 
measures. In particular, the target indicator can be constructed by subtracting each mark-up value 
from the maximum value. The transformation was executed in order to make the measure 
comparable to the other indicators of competition. Thus, the derived measure implies that its higher 
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values are associated with higher degree of competition. Throughout the paper, this measure is 
called “the mark-up measure”). 
The second measure of competition is import penetration. As an approximation of competition the 
measure is used in the papers by Nickell (1996), Blundell et al. (1999). Import penetration reflects 
the significance of imports on domestic markets. The indicator is calculated as a ratio between the 
value of imports and total domestic demand. Import penetration is an approximation of 
international market pressure. Import penetration is perceived as a direct measure of competition. 
Higher share of import in domestic demand implies higher competition pressure on domestic 
producers. However, high reliance on foreign products may reflect better competence of 
international producers and lack of expertise among local firms. Import penetration is a crude 
approximation of competition degree, since some markets can experience tough inner competition 
with no pressure from international firms. However, the measure is worth taking into account.   
Finally, the number of firms is also considered among competition indicators. The measure does 
not capture change in aggressiveness of interaction between firms. Nevertheless, an increase in the 
number of firms is commonly associated with higher degree of competition (Boone 2000). As a 
matter of fact, on the example of Chinese firms Du and Chen (2010) show that the number of firms 
is strongly correlated with measures of market concentration and Lerner index, while displaying 
insignificant correlation with size inequality measures (such as market share). However naive the 
measure is, it may be a proper approximation of competition for “neck-and-neck” industries (Du 
& Chen 2010).  
All three measures significantly differ from each other, as each measure focuses on different 
aspects of market performance. Table 1 shows pairwise correlations between the measures. It can 
be seen that the mark-up measure is only slightly correlated with the rest two measures. 
Table 1. Correlations between competition measures 
  Mark-up Import penetration Number of firms 
Mark-up 
1.000   
Import penetration 
0.1603* 1.000  
Number of firms 
0.0448* 0.0025 1.000 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Usage of firm-level data would allow having a broader range of competition variables. For 
instance, based on extensive firm-level dataset Lerner index can be calculated. However, due to 
the data limitations implementation of firm-level measures is out of scope of this study.  
2.2.2. Measurement of innovation  
It is commonly asserted that innovation is hard to quantify properly. Since innovation comprises 
importance of ideas, skills, creativity and learning process, it is difficult to choose a suitable 
numeric approximation for it. This study is based on R&D intensity as a measure of innovation. 
In the framework of this paper R&D intensity is defined as R&D expenditure divided by value 
added. R&D intensity is a common measure of innovation activity in the economic research. The 
data on R&D intensity has been published for a long time spans and is comparable across countries. 
The major disadvantage is that R&D component represents inputs of innovation and not outputs. 
Despite its theoretical drawbacks, R&D intensity is broadly used in empirical literature on 
innovation. Data on the R&D intensity was collected form OECD STAN Database. The R&D 
intensity was obtained on industry-level for manufacturing industries classified in accordance with 
ISIC Rev.3 (International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities, Rev.3).  
Alternatively, the data on outputs could be obtained from the Community Innovation Survey 
(CIS). Apart from being able to approximate innovation output, the CIS data has a plenty of other 
advantages (covers process innovation, captures type of improvements, etc.). However, the CIS 
data does not exist for the period under consideration and, therefore, cannot be used.  Another 
commonly used approximation of innovation output is patent count. The main drawback of using 
patent-based indicators is that patents approximate inventions, rather than innovation. Secondly, 
the role of patents across industries considerably differs. Thirdly, in some cases registration of a 
new patent may be more of a formal character and may not imply the further realization of 
innovator’s idea. Usage of patent-based indicators is out of scope of this study.  
2.2.3. Control variables 
As for the control variables, following Furman et al. (2002) and Levin et al. (1985) GDP per capita, 
spending on education as a percentage of GDP and stock market capitalization as a percentage of 
GDP. The data was obtained from the World Development Indicators Database. 
2.2.4. Definition of the market 
Discussion if the relationship between competition and innovation encompasses a concept of the 
market on which firms innovate and on which changes in competition intensity occur. In fact, 
market is a rather abstract and complex concept. As a result of data limitation in the empirical 
20 
 
studies the market is usually defined as an industry, where industry borders are determined in 
accordance with an industry classification (e.g. ISIC Rev. 3). The drawback of such an aggregation 
is that industry classifications are quite formal definitions and do not reflect real market 
boundaries. In reality, the number of markets may not correspond to the classified number of 
industries. In addition, firms operating in the same industry may compete on different markets. 
Such an aggregation assumes that all the firms in the industry are exposed to the same degree of 
competition. Nevertheless, potentially firms may be more heterogeneous and, thus, experience 
different levels of the competition pressure. All in all, despite the fact that treating industry as a 
market is subject to some inaccuracy, such definition is a common way of dealing with the market-
level indicators. Terms “market” and “industry” are used interchangeably in the rest of the paper.  
2.2.5. Endogeneity problem 
Previous literature emphasizes that the endogeneity problem may arise when the relationship 
between competition and innovation is examined. Presumably, the reverse causality may take 
place, implying that innovative performance of firms has an influence on the degree of competition 
on the market. For instance, profits used for constructing the mark-up measure may have reflected 
changes in innovative activity of firms.  
To control for endogeneity a policy reform is considered as a robustness check. More specifically, 
the study takes into account the actual market policy that affected competition rates in the 
European Union. In particular, the Single Market Programme (SMP) is considered. The SMP was 
launched in 19924. The programme aimed, inter alia, to promote competition within the European 
Union and to boost economic growth. More specifically, the programme was launched in order to 
decrease existing trade barriers for the Member States and promote the cross-border procurement. 
These initiatives aimed to reduce market power of dominant firms, facilitate new market entries, 
bring down barriers to capital and labour movement. The favourable effect of the SMP on the 
competition across European industries has been documented in several studies (e.g. Allen et al. 
1998; Bottasso & Sembenelli 2001; Badinger 2007). It has been shown that intensity of the cross-
border trade considerably intensified and the price dispersion decreased after the programme was 
put in force. Since the SMP affected the average level of the product market competition, the study 
treats the SMP as an exogenous shock.  
The expected macroeconomic outcomes of the integration within European countries were 
evaluated in so-called Cecchini Report. To estimate the implications of the programme three 
                                                 
4 In the paper time of launching is understood as a time when the reform came into force 
(http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/top_layer/historical_overview/background_en.htm)  
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measures were compared across sectors of the Member States. These measures included the degree 
of non-tariff barriers in the industry, price dispersion for identical goods and the intensity of trade 
with other Member States. Based on these three indicators about 40 three-digit sectors (according 
to NACE classification) were labelled as expected to be sensitive to the programme effects. The 
set of sensitive sectors was adjusted for the Member States based on the differences in the 
industrial structure and pace of economic development. In particular, several more sectors were 
added for Southern European countries.   
The study by Buigues et al. (1990) assesses the structural adjustment of Member States to the 
SMP. The study scrutinizes the impact the reform had on sectors across the Member States. Based 
on the estimates provided by the report, the affected industries can be distinguished. In the report 
the affected industries are defined according to NACE classification codes. To make the data 
comparable it was converted into ISIC Rev.3. This information was used to construct a dummy 
variable for the reform effects. The variable equals one for affected sector in the Member State 
during the years when the SMP was taking place. The list of the industries can be found in the 
Appendix, Table 1. Table 2 in the Appendix contains the list of industries affected by the SMP.  
2.2.6. Sample 
The period under consideration is from 1987 to 2006. The data was obtained for manufacturing 
industries of seven European countries: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Spain, Sweden, Finland 
and Norway. Industry classification ISIC Rev.3 was used for data collection. The list of industries 
can be found in the Appendix, Table 1. The sample represents a certain degree of variety since the 
countries under consideration demonstrated dissimilar patterns of economic development over the 
period. Unit of observation is an industry in a particular country5. The sample is unbalanced due 
to a number of missing observations in the data source. A few observations were eliminated from 
the sample as outliers6. Descriptive statistics are shown in the Table 2. 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
  
Number of 
observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
R&D intensity   2389 0.065 0.081 0 0.395 
Mark-up  2023 1.333 0.49 0.02 7.419 
Import penetration 2080 45.059 24.793 4.016 99.795 
Number of firms 1466 3032 6065 1 44928 
GDP per capita 2389 34062.5 11058.6 16547.51 67804.6 
Education spending  1807 5.874 1.423 3.03 8.438 
Stock MC 2107 59.425 38.462 11.45 246.05 
                                                 
5 For instance, the first observation is Food Industry in Denmark in 1987, the second observation is Food Industry in 
Germany in 1987 
6 Observations with R&D intensity > 0.4 were considered as outliers, following Du and Chen (2010)   
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Apart from the drawbacks of empirical estimation mentioned above, some more limitations should 
be acknowledged. First of all, the paper explores a quadratic function to test the non-linearity 
proposition, while theory does not suggest that the relationship between competition and 
innovation is namely quadratic. Non-linearity can also be modelled by means of other non-
monotonic specifications. Secondly, data limitations affect definition of the market and 
quantification of the key variables. Finally, data aggregation neglects firm-level unobserved 
characteristics, which potentially can explain more about innovation performance of firms.  
3. Results  
This section presents the results of econometric estimation. Firstly, the static model (I) is discussed 
and, secondly, estimation of the dynamic model (III) is presented. Then a few more specifications 
are explored. On the whole, the analysis provides empirical evidence in support of the non-linear 
relationship between innovation and competition. The hypothesis is supported for the mark-up 
measure. The analysis demonstrates, that when initially competition is low, a rise in competition 
positively affects innovation. While under higher competition pressure, an upsurge of competition 
has a negative effect on R&D intensity. This result is perceived as supporting the hypothesis of 
the U-inverted non-linear relationship between competition and innovation. The estimation results 
for import penetration do not correspond to the non-linearity proposition. The analysis of the 
number of firms does not support non-linearity either.  
3.1. Static model 
Firstly, the method of estimation is outlined. Then, the model estimation is described for the mark-
up measure. Next, estimation results for import penetration and the number of firms are discussed.  
3.1.1. Approach to estimation 
In assumption that there is no correlation between explanatory variable 𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑡 and the error term, 
pooled OLS model provides consistent estimates. However, estimates of random effects model are 
by definition more efficient. In addition, Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier point to the 
preference of the random effects model over OLS estimation. However, in assumption that 
explanatory variable 𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑡 and the error term are correlated, neither OLS, nor random effects 
estimates are consistent. It may be assumed that the error term (𝜐𝑖𝑐𝑡) is presented in the following 
way: 
𝜐𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝜂𝑗 + 𝜑𝑐 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡, 
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where industry effects are captured by variable 𝜂𝑗, country effects by 𝜑𝑐 and 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡 denotes the error 
term. Further, it may be assumed, that correlation between explanatory variable 𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑡  and the error 
term appears, because the explanatory variable 𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑡  is correlated with two components of 𝜐𝑖𝑐𝑡, 
namely with industry effects 𝜂𝑗 and country effects 𝜑𝑐. The assumption that 𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑡 is correlated with 
𝜂𝑖 and 𝜑𝑐, and is not correlated with 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡 fits the fixed effects model. The fixed effects approach 
removes the impact of time-invariant individual characteristics which are assumed to be correlated 
with the dependent variable. As for the model under consideration, F-test indicates that fixed 
effects model is preferable as compared to a pooled OLS regression.  
3.1.2. Mark-up measure 
Several tests were conducted to diagnose the model where the mark-up measure is used to 
approximate competition. Modified Wald test for group-wise heteroscedasticity detected the 
presence of heteroscedasticity. Wooldridge test for autocorrelation indicated that there is 
autocorrelation in the data. To remedy autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity, data transformation 
suggested by Baltagi and Wu (1999) was carried out. The transformation deals with both 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation problems, thus providing efficient and consistent estimates. 
Hausman test showed that for specification with the mark-up measure random effects model is 
preferred over fixed effects. The results are presented for both types of models (Table 3).  
Table 3. Estimation results of model (I). The mark-up measure. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
              
Competition  0.041***  0.063***  0.080***  0.071***  0.086***  0.076*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) 
Competition^2 -0.002* -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.009*** -0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
GDP per capita   0.000*** -0.000* 0.000 -0.000 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Education spending   0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001 
   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Stock MC     0.000 0.000 
     (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.120*** 0.138*** -0.026*** 0.133*** -0.012*** 0.143*** 
 (0.002) (0.009) (0.003) (0.029) (0.004) (0.039) 
       
Observations 1,892 2,023 1,468 1,599 1,388 1,519 
Number of groups 130 131 130 131 130 131 
Country FE YES NO YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES NO YES YES YES YES 
Year FE NO NO YES YES YES YES 
              
Dependent variable is R&D intensity      
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 demonstrate the basic models with only competition and 
competition squared as explanatory variables. The other specifications include control variables 
and dummy variables for years. The random effects specifications presented in columns (4) and 
(6) also include dummy variables for industry and country effects.  
It can be seen, that the competition and squared competition variables are highly significant for all 
the specifications. A positive sign of the linear term and a negative of the quadratic term 
correspond to the U-inverted relationship between mark-ups and R&D intensity, as it was 
expected. The U-inverted relationship implies that when the level of competition is low, a rise in 
competition rises R&D intensity. While with higher degree of competition on the market an 
upsurge of competition is associated with lower R&D intensity. The prediction plot can be found 
in the Appendix, Figure 1. 
Since Hausman test points that random effects model is preferred over fixed effects, the model 
displayed in Column (6) is used for interpretation. First of all, the marginal effect can be 
interpreted. For the mean value of the mark-up measure (the mean value equals 1,34) the marginal 
effect is positive and equals 0.054. This effect signifies that one unit change when competition 
increases by one unit, for an industry that experiences a mean value of mark-ups, R&D intensity 
increases by 0.054.  
Next, the U-inverted curve reaches its peak (the turning point) when the mark-up value equals 
4.75. An important observation here is that the mark-up value of 4,75 lies in the range of the 
dataset, consequently, the point at which the effect of competition turns from positive into negative 
is within the range of the dataset. It should be noted that the peak value is higher than mean and 
median value. In fact, the peak value is closer to the third quartile of the mark-up value. Thus, 
industries are not equally distributed along the curve, but rather are shifted to the left tail. More 
specifically, about 75% of industries lie on the left tail of the inverted U-curve, revealing that on 
average these 75% of industries demonstrate lower competition levels, and increase in competition 
for these industries leads to an increase in R&D intensity. In terms used by Aghion et al. (2005) 
the majority of industries in the sample are “neck-and-neck” industries, where technological 
advancement of firms is similar and an increase in competition promotes innovative activity. At 
the same time about 25% of the sample are “leader-follower” industries, where some firms have 
lower production costs, than their followers, and in response to higher competition pressure these 
industries reduce investment in innovation. The obtained distribution of industries differs from the 
results in Aghion et al. (2005), where the turning point of the inverted U-curve corresponds to the 
median value of competition, implying that industries in the sample of the UK firms are evenly 
spread along the curve. At the same time the derived results are in line with the results discussed 
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in the study by Polder and Veldhuizen (2010), where the majority of industries in the sample (about 
75% of industries in the Netherlands) are “neck-and-neck”, while the rest are closer to “leader-
follower” industries. Thus, the study demonstrates that in the Netherlands the majority of 
industries experience increase in innovation activity when competition degree becomes stronger. 
This discrepancy in results points to the difference in the industrial mix across different countries.  
An important remark here is that the estimation results may noticeably differ from sample to 
sample. When the sample to a greater extent is represented by industries of one type, it is more 
likely to detect a linear relationship between competition and innovation. In fact, using the same 
mark-up measure as approximation of competition, Griffith et al. (2010) find a positive linear 
dependence between competition and innovation. Sample construction is presumably among the 
reasons of the dissimilarity in the results. In particular, insignificance of a non-linear relationship 
described by Griffith et al. (2010) may have arisen due to the prevalence of “neck-and-neck” 
industries in the sample. 
 
3.1.3. Import penetration  
As regards import penetration, the diagnostic tests detected heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, 
which were tackled in a similar way as for the mark-up measure. The estimation results do not 
offer support for the U-inverted relationship (Table 4, Columns (7)-(10)). Specifications 
demonstrated in Columns (7) and (8) represent a linear model. Estimation provides evidence for 
the positive influence on R&D intensity. Specifications displayed in Columns (9) and (10) test the 
non-linearity hypothesis. It can be seen, that analysis does not support the non-linear relationship. 
Consequently, interpretation is done only for the linear specification. Hausman test suggests that 
the fixed effects model describes data better than random effects. Therefore, interpretation of the 
linear model is based on the specification demonstrated in Column (7). Other things being equal, 
with one unit growth in share of imports in total domestic demand average R&D intensity of 
industries rises by 0.001.   
Thus, when competition is measured as import penetration, analysis shows that an increase in 
import penetration leads to higher R&D expenditure, implying a positive linkage between 
competition and innovation. In fact, the positive relationship between import penetration and 
innovation activity is in line with the results described in earlier studies (Nickell 1996; Blundell et 
al. 1999). Increase in import penetration occurs either due to an upsurge of imports or due to a 
decrease in the domestic demand. The former corresponds well to the stronger competition 
pressure, while the latter is not associated with higher competition. Growth in imports promotes 
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rivalry among firms on the market. Blundell et al. (1999) suppose that import penetration captures 
only international competition pressure (so-called “trade effect”), while it does not reflect change 
in the degree of domestic competition. On the whole, after the SMP was launched in 1992, trade 
barriers across the Member States diminished and amount of imported goods enlarged (Allen et 
al. 1998). Therefore, it is more likely that an increase in import penetration occurred namely due 
to the trade effect and not due to a slump in demand.  
It can be noticed that the positive relationship derived from the model with import penetration as 
an explanatory variable is partly in line with the results for the mark-up measure. As it was shown 
for the mark-up measure, the majority of industries demonstrate the positive relationship between 
increase in product market competition and change in R&D intensity. 
 
Table 4. Estimation results of model (I). Import penetration and Number of firms. 
  Import penetration Number of firms 
  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)  (13)     (14) 
VARIABLES 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
                  
Competition 0.001*** 0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Competition^2   0.000*** 0.000***   0.000 0.000 
   (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP per capita 0.000*** -0.000 0.000*** -0.000* 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Education spending 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Constant -0.008*** 0.009 -0.009*** 0.034 -0.008 0.030 -0.008 0.030 
 (0.003) (0.027) (0.003) (0.027) (0.005) (0.052) (0.005) (0.052) 
          
Observations 1,457 1,579 1,457 1,579 1,026 1,150 1,026 1,150 
Number of groups 120 122 120 122 123 124 123 124 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
                  
Dependent variable is R&D intensity     
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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3.1.4. Number of firms 
In a way similar to previously discussed, diagnostic tests were conducted for the specifications, 
where competition is approximated by the number of firms on the market, and the transformation 
was implemented. Columns (11)-(14) display the specifications which use the number of firms as 
a proxy for competition. Estimation reveals no significant relationship for all four specifications. 
As it was previously discussed, the number of firms is believed to be a good approximation of 
competition for more “neck-and-neck” markets. Although, estimation for the mark-up measure 
shows that the majority of industries under consideration are “neck-and-neck” industries, the 
number of firms is not significant.  Presumably, the effect discussed in the paper by Boone (2000) 
may be the reason for insignificant results. More specifically, the author claims that when 
competition pressure arises due to higher aggressiveness of competitors, some firms may leave the 
market if they expect difficulties in keeping the pace of the opponents. Thus, the number of firms 
may diminish or stay unchanged when competition rises.   
On the whole, dissimilarities in the estimation among used indicators are not surprising. As it is 
shown in Table 1, the indicators are not strongly correlated. Moreover, all three indicators 
represent very different phenomena. As it was already emphasized, as a measure of competition 
the number of firms neglects aggressiveness of interactions among rivals. It is also limited to a 
definition of market and, therefore, does not reflect an impact of international competitors. 
International competition is well reflected by import penetration. At the same time, import 
penetration does not capture the effect from domestic competition. As for the mark-up measure, it 
is believed to reflect the impact of both international and domestic competitors. When there is a 
strong pressure caused by international producers on the market, local firms are likely to 
experience changes in their profits and thus in mark-ups. At the same time, mark-ups are also 
affected when there is no international competition, but domestic rivalry is substantial. 
Furthermore, mark-ups are influenced by intensified aggressiveness of interaction among firms. 
Based on this line of reasoning, the mark-up measure can be perceived as a better approximation 
of competition pressure, than import penetration and the number of firms. Thus, this study treats 
namely the mark-up measure as more reliable. 
3.1.5. Robustness check 
In addition, the static model (I) was estimated for those industries that were affected by the SMP. 
For these industries, growth of competition degree was exogenous. The estimation results provide 
evidence for the U-inverted relationship (Table 5). Support for the inverted U-curve derived from 
the analysis of affected industries is considered as an indication of the robustness of results derived 
for the whole sample.   
28 
 
Table5. Estimation results of model (I). Industries affected by SMP  
  (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
VARIABLES 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
              
Competition  0.023**  0.054***  0.050***  0.050***  0.053***  0.042*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) 
Competition^2 -0.001 -0.007*** -0.005** -0.005** -0.006** -0.004 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
GDP per capita   0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Education spending   0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 
   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Stock MC   -0.000** -0.000 0.000 0.000 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.099*** 0.126*** 0.006** 0.054** -0.003 0.010 
 (0.003) (0.012) (0.003) (0.022) (0.004) (0.065) 
       
Observations 1,063 1,151 756 844 756 844 
Number of id2 88 88 88 88 88 88 
Country FE YES NO YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES NO YES YES YES YES 
Year FE NO NO YES YES YES YES 
              
Dependent variable is R&D intensity 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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3.2. Dynamic model 
This subsection describes estimation results for a model with the lagged R&D intensity. The 
purpose is to investigate whether non-linearity holds when lagged R&D intensity is included into 
the model. Therefore, analysis is conducted only for the mark-up measure, which was the only 
measure that provided support for non-linearity in static models. The results of estimation are in 
line with those of the static model.  
Adding lagged R&D intensity in the model (I) would provoke correlation between the lagged 
variable and the error term, therefore, to avoid correlation the model can be transformed into the 
model in differences (III). However, in the model in first differences one of the explanatory 
variables ∆𝑦𝑖𝑐𝑡−1 is correlated with the transformed error term ∆𝜐𝑖𝑐𝑡. So as not to provide 
inconsistent estimated, ∆𝑦𝑖𝑐𝑡−1  was instrumented by 𝑦𝑖𝑐𝑡−2. Even though this transformation leads 
to a small loss in the number of observations, it is a common approach to instrumenting the lagged 
variable, because the derived instrument is highly correlated with the variable and is not correlated 
with the error term.  
Table 6. Estimation results of model (III). Mark-up  
  (21) (22) 
VARIABLES   
      
∆ R&D intensity (t-1) 0.531*** 0.577** 
 (0.158) (0.247) 
∆ Competition  0.090***  0.115*** 
 (0.010) (0.017) 
∆ Competition^2 -0.010*** -0.012*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) 
∆ GDP per capita  -0.000 
  (0.000) 
∆ Education spending  -0.002 
  (0.003) 
∆ Stock MC  0.000 
  (0.000) 
Constant 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
   
Observations 1,745 1,158 
Country FE NO YES 
Industry FE NO YES 
Year FE NO YES 
Dependent variable is R&D intensity  
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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The estimation was conducted by means of 2SLS method. The dynamic model was estimated only 
for the mark-up measure, since it was the only measure that revealed significant non-monotonic 
relationship with R&D intensity. Estimation results provide support for the hypothesis of the non-
linear relationship between competition and innovation (Table 6). First-stage estimation results are 
reported in the Appendix, Table 5. 
Column (21) displays the basic specification. Control variables and dummies are included in the 
model shown in Column (22).  Even though the impact on R&D intensity is to a greater extent 
caused by the lagged R&D intensity, the competition measures still have the expected signs. Thus, 
the derived results correspond to the estimation of the static model in particular and to the non-
linearity hypothesis in general.  
3.3 Additional specifications 
This subsection presents a few more specifications of the model (I).  
3.3.1. Scandinavian countries 
The first one was considered to check whether the results hold for Scandinavian countries only. 
As it was mentioned in literature review, Scandinavian countries have not been extensively 
examined before. Moreover, the interest in constructing the sample only for Nordic countries was 
motivated by the following observation. In the study by Griffith et al. (2010) authors intentionally 
omit Scandinavian countries due to the different industrial structure.   
Table 7. Estimation results of model (I). Scandinavian versus non-Scandinavian countries    
  Scandinavian non Scandinavian 
  (23) (24) 
VARIABLES   
      
Competition  0.076***  0.039*** 
 (0.012) (0.006) 
Competition ^2 -0.006** -0.003*** 
 (0.003) (0.001) 
GDP per capita -0.000** 0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Education spending -0.002 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.001) 
Constant 0.179*** -0.124 
 (0.060) (0.079) 
Observations 997 602 
Number of groups 68 63 
Country FE YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
      
Dependent variable is R&D intensity 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Estimation shows that when distinguishing between Scandinavian (Denmark, Finland, Norway, 
Sweden) and non-Scandinavian (Belgium, Germany, Spain), models differ in coefficients, but still 
provide significant coefficients in support of the non-linear relationship (Table 7). Thus, according 
to the conducted analysis, the results supporting non-linearity hold for Scandinavian countries. 
The prediction plots are illustrated in the Appendix, Figure 2. 
3.3.2. High-tech versus low-tech industries 
Furthermore, it seems interesting to compare high-tech and low-tech sectors in their responses to 
competition pressure (Table 8). To differentiate industries traditional classification suggested by 
OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 1999 was used. The classification is based 
on average R&D intensity. Industries 24, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34 and 35 were labelled as high-tech. 
The rest were considered as low-tech industries. 
 
Table 8. Estimation results of model (I). High-tech versus low-tech industries    
  High-tech Low-tech 
  (25) (26) 
VARIABLES   
      
Competition  0.124***  0.022*** 
 (0.022) (0.003) 
Competition ^2 -0.012** -0.002*** 
 (0.006) (0.000) 
GDP per capita -0.000 -0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Education spending -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.004) (0.001) 
Constant 0.294*** 0.056*** 
 (0.052) (0.010) 
   
Observations 685 914 
Number of groups 54 77 
Country FE YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
      
Dependent variable is R&D intensity  
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Marginal effects were calculated for the mean value of the mark-up measure of the whole sample 
(mean value equals 1,34) to make the results comparable. For the mean value of the mark-up 
measure in high-tech industries the marginal effect is positive and equals 0.092. It indicates that 
when competition increases by one unit, for a high-tech industry that experiences a mean value of 
mark-ups, R&D intensity increases by 0.092. The marginal effect for low-tech industries is lower 
in absolute magnitude. It is also positive and equals 0.017, signifying that when competition rises 
by one unit for a low-tech industry that experiences a mean value of mark-ups, R&D intensity 
increases by 0.017. Thus for the mean mark-up level, the positive impact of competition pressure 
is more pronounced for high-tech industries.  In other words, high-tech industries are on average 
more sensitive to changes in competition, than low-tech. The visualization of the differences 
between two types of sectors is presented in the Appendix, Figure 3. The result indicates that not 
only the absolute amount of R&D intensity is larger for high-tech sectors, but also the degree of 
the response is greater. The interpretation might be that by definition performance of high-tech 
sectors, as opposed to low-tech, depends more on innovation, therefore, namely innovative activity 
is an important way of responding to economic shocks. While low-tech industries may rely more 
on other factors of economic performance, high-tech sectors respond to changes in economic 
environment mostly by adjusting R&D-related activities.  
4. Discussion 
All in all, the analysis shows that examination of the relationship between innovation and 
competition is sensitive to the choice of measures. In this study the empirical investigation 
provides a support for non-linearity between competition and R&D intensity only when 
competition is approximated by the mark-up measure. Import penetration detects the linear 
relationship, and the number of firms does not reveal any significant relationship. However, based 
on the essence of the measure, namely the mark-up measure is believed to be better approximation 
of competition as compared to the other considered indicators. Therefore, relying on the estimation 
of models with the mark-up measure as an explanatory variable, it can be concluded that the 
analysis supports the non-linear U-inverted relationship between innovative activity and the degree 
of product market competition.  
The derived non-linear relationship indicates that when industries initially experience low 
competition pressure, a change in the degree of product market competition results in a rise in 
R&D intensity. When industries initially face higher degree of competition, further growth of 
competition pressure reduces R&D intensity. Thus, when competition is low, “escape-
competition-effect” takes place, while when competition is high, “Schumpeterian effect” 
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dominates. According to the theoretical framework proposed by Aghion et al. (2005) these results 
can be interpreted in the following way. As it was discussed in the first section, Aghion’s model 
proposes that low level of competition is associated with “neck-and-neck” industries. Firms in 
these industries earn medium profits and have no incentives to change their production 
technologies. When competition rises in these industries, the firms tend to invest in innovation in 
order to escape competition and to avoid a fall of profits. Consequently, a rise of competition leads 
to a rise of innovation activity. While high degree of competition is associated with “leader-
follower” industries. “Leaders” do not innovate, because they are already on higher technological 
level then their rivals. Whereas for “leaders” further upsurge of competition implies that they 
experience further decrease in profits, moreover, the reward for catching up with “leaders” 
decreases. Hence, when the initial degree of competition is high, further increase in competition 
entails lower innovation activity. Thus, according to Aghion’s model, the U-inverted relationship 
arises, because on the markets with low levels of competition firms respond to an increase in 
competition by investing more in innovation. Whereas on the markets with initially high 
competition, further increases in competition discourage firms from investing in innovation.  
As estimation reveals, the industries under consideration are unevenly spread along the inverted 
U-curve. In particular, the majority of industries demonstrate the positive relationship between 
competition and R&D intensity. It indicates that “neck-and-neck” industries are prevalent in the 
sample. These industries are associated with lower competition and more similar level of 
technological advancement. 
It should be also kept in mind, that estimation results can be discussed only as a support for non-
linearity. As it was underlined, absolute values of competition-related variables are subject to 
estimation bias. Therefore, such estimates as a turning point of the inverted U-curve should not be 
interpreted as a numerical expression of competition degree that turns industry into “leader-
follower” from “neck-and-neck”.  
An important implication for the research design follows from the conducted analysis. Uneven 
distribution of industries along the curve implies that the results of empirical examination depend 
on the industry mix under consideration. According to the model described by Aghion et al. (2005), 
the positive effect of competition is observed for “neck-and-neck” industries, whereas “leader-
follower” industries reveal the negative relationship. Presumably, prevalence of one type of 
industries in a sample can explain the significance of the linear relationship documented by some 
of the previous studies. An additional remark is that when analysis aims to refute or support 
Aghion’s proposition, a large sample should be used (preferably rich in both years and countries 
of observation). 
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Several suggestions for perspective research follow from this study. Firstly, it may be interesting 
to conduct analysis for non-manufacturing industries and compare with present results. Secondly, 
process innovation can be considered. Thirdly, firm-level indicators can be used to construct 
competition measures and to control for firm-level characteristics.  
As for policy implications, analysis shows that industries under consideration are not homogenous. 
According to the estimation results, industries respond differently to changes in economic 
conditions. Stimulation of competition in “neck-and-neck” industries provokes innovative activity. 
Thus, lower entry costs and trade barriers for these industries are expected to trigger innovation 
output. At the same time, for “leader-follower” industries intensifying competition policies 
discourage innovation. Consequently, a common belief that competition improves corporate 
performance and economic welfare is arguable for these industries. In order to promote innovation 
policy makers should focus on assisting laggard firms (“followers”) in catching up with dominant 
firms (“leaders”).  
5. Conclusion 
The paper has examined the relationship between innovation and competition. In particular, the 
hypothesis about the non-linear relationship between competition and R&D intensity has been 
tested. This study has employed a rich dataset containing data for seven European countries for a 
period from 1987 to 2006, thus allowing for greater variation in data. Despite being intentionally 
ignored in the previous empirical studies, four Scandinavian countries have also been included in 
the sample. Due to the complexity of competition as economic phenomenon, the paper has 
considered three different measures of competition. The mark-up measure, import penetration and 
the number of firms have been analyzed. 
The analysis conducted for the mark-up measure provides the empirical support for the non-linear 
relationship between mark-ups and R&D intensity. The documented relationship infers that when 
the initial level of competition is low, an increase in competition rises R&D intensity. While with 
initially higher degree of competition on the market an upsurge of competition leads to lower R&D 
intensity. The result is consistent with the conclusions discussed by Aghion et al. (2005), as well 
as with the analysis of Chinese industries by Du and Chen (2010) and the study of industries in 
the Netherlands by Polder and Veldhuizen (2010). The policy reform (the Single Market 
Programme) has also been considered to add robustness to the analysis in respect of the potential 
endogeneity of competition. Finally, estimation of the model with lagged R&D intensity provided 
evidence in support of non-linearity. Additionally, the model with the mark-up measure has been 
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explored in a few more specifications. The results show that non-linearity holds for the sample 
restricted only to Scandinavian countries. Furthermore, non-linearity is found to hold for both 
high- and low-tech sectors. Particularly, high-tech sectors are found to be more sensitive in their 
response to changes in competition pressure.   
At the same time, two other measures of competition do not support the non-linearity proposition. 
Examination of import penetration reveals its positive influence on R&D intensity, which may 
possibly be interpreted as a stimulating effect of international trade. Whereas, the number of firms 
is found insignificant as a determinant of innovative activity.  
Major policy implication of the analysis follows from the finding that the industries under review 
respond differently to changes in the degree of competition. Thus, different policy tools should be 
used to boost innovative activity among these industries. Stimulation of competition in “neck-and-
neck” industries is expected to trigger innovation output, while for “leader-follower” industries it 
is more important to assist laggard firms in catching-up with the “leaders” so as to encourage 
innovation.    
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Appendix 
Table 1. List of industries  
Number of 
industry 
Industry name 
Number of 
observations 
Mean R&D 
intensity 
15 Food products and beverages 59 0.0089 
16 Tobacco products 58 0.0129 
17 Textiles 86 0.0208 
18 Wearing apparel, dressing and dying of fur 83 0.0110 
19 Leather, leather products and footwear 84 0.0145 
20 Wood and products of wood and cork 120 0.0063 
21 Pulp, paper and paper products 111 0.0184 
22 Printing and publishing 111 0.0036 
23 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 100 0.0346 
24 Chemicals and chemical products 119 0.1462 
25 Rubber and plastics products 139 0.0306 
26 Other non-metallic mineral products 139 0.0172 
27 Basic metals 139 0.0280 
28 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 139 0.0159 
29 Machinery and equipment, nec 139 0.0656 
30 Office, accounting and computing machinery 127 0.1707 
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec. 139 0.0744 
32 Radio, television and communication equipment 97 0.2646 
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments 137 0.1378 
34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 127 0.0901 
35 Other transport equipment 136 0.1154 
 
 
Table 2. Industries affected by the Single Market Programme 
Country Industry number 
Belgium 15, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35 
Denmark 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34 
Germany 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35 
Finland* 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34 
Spain 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35 
Sweden* 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34 
*Finland and Sweden joined European Union in 1995, therefore, the effect of the SMP is accounted for only from 
1995 for these countries. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics for variables used for estimation of Capital Costs 
  
 
Number of 
observations 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Gross fixed capital formation, mln   2082 1402.879 2139.697 0 16654 
Labour costs, mln  2227 6733.16 10564.07 13 76801 
Value added, mln  2243 7225.375 10132.57 18 74600 
Interest rate USA  2389 6.112378 1.501652 4.02 8.85 
Depreciation rate  2389 0.05 0 0.05 0.05 
Capital Costs, mln  2082 514.718 817.29 0.259697 6612.236 
             
 
Figure 1. Quadratic prediction plot for model (I). Mark-up. 
 
The outlying value corresponds to the mark-up measure of 7.42. The estimation results hold if 
the outlier is eliminated from the sample (see Table 5 below).  
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Table 4. Estimation results of model (I) after the outlier have been eliminated 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
       
Competition  0.036***  0.072***  0.088***  0.079***  0.086***  0.076*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Competition ^2 -0.001 -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.008*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
GDP per capita   0.000*** -0.000* 0.000 -0.000 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Education spending   -0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001 
   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Stock MC     0.000 0.000 
     (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.115*** 0.146*** -0.026*** 0.141*** -0.012*** 0.143*** 
 (0.002) (0.010) (0.003) (0.030) (0.004) (0.039) 
       
Observations 1,891 2,022 1,467 1,598 1,388 1,519 
Number of groups 130 131 130 131 130 131 
Country FE YES NO YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES NO YES YES YES YES 
Year FE NO NO YES YES YES YES 
              
Dependent variable is R&D intensity      
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
 
 
Table 5. First-stage equation for the dynamic model 
  (1) 
VARIABLES First stage 
    
∆Competition -0.053*** 
 (0.009) 
∆ Competition ^2  0.006*** 
 (0.002) 
∆GDP per capita -0.000** 
 (0.000) 
∆Education spending 0.000 
 (0.003) 
∆Stock MC -0.000 
 (0.000) 
R&D intensity(t-2) -0.041*** 
 (0.009) 
Constant 0.008*** 
 (0.002) 
  
Observations 1,158 
Estimation results for the first stage equation, where for the first-differences model the difference in lagged R&D 
intensity is instrumented with R&D intensity of a period t-2;  
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 2.  Fitted values for a sample of Scandinavian and non-Scandinavian countries 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Fitted values for a sample of high-tech and low-tech sectors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
